Earth Hour - a waste of energy?
Affluent societies have become shallow and insincere towards other people and the serious problems facing the world.Environment - Bernie Masters - posted 31/3/2009
Carbon trading must balance environmental, economic and legal needs
Free carbon trading permits would clearly offend the principle of environmental responsibility for the benefit of short-term economic gain.Environment - Nicola Durrant - posted 31/3/2009
Showing posts with label Carbon Permits. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Carbon Permits. Show all posts
Tuesday, March 31, 2009
Tuesday, November 18, 2008
A Credible Foundation for Long Term International Cooperation on Climate Change
A Credible Foundation for Long Term International Cooperation on Climate Change
Climate and Energy Economics, Climate Change, Trade, Environment, Energy Security
Peter J. Wilcoxen, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Global Economy and Development
Warwick J. McKibbin, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Global Economy and Development
Brookings Discussion Papers in International Economics # 171
To succeed in reducing carbon dioxide emissions, a climate policy must establish credible long-term incentives for investments in new energy-sector capital and in research and development. We argue that credibility implies that international agreements should focus on enhancing coordination and collaboration between countries, rather than on coercion.
At the national level, credibility requires political and economic incentives that can be provided by long-term tradable emissions permits, but it needs more flexibility than can be provided by a conventional permit system. We argue that the best mechanism for providing credible long-term incentives is a hybrid system of long and short term emissions permits. Key aspects of the system would be coordinated across countries but the permits would be issued and traded solely within national borders.
Climate and Energy Economics, Climate Change, Trade, Environment, Energy Security
Peter J. Wilcoxen, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Global Economy and Development
Warwick J. McKibbin, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Global Economy and Development
Brookings Discussion Papers in International Economics # 171
To succeed in reducing carbon dioxide emissions, a climate policy must establish credible long-term incentives for investments in new energy-sector capital and in research and development. We argue that credibility implies that international agreements should focus on enhancing coordination and collaboration between countries, rather than on coercion.
At the national level, credibility requires political and economic incentives that can be provided by long-term tradable emissions permits, but it needs more flexibility than can be provided by a conventional permit system. We argue that the best mechanism for providing credible long-term incentives is a hybrid system of long and short term emissions permits. Key aspects of the system would be coordinated across countries but the permits would be issued and traded solely within national borders.
Thursday, July 31, 2008
Ernst & Young emits a greenhouse warning
Australasian Business Intelligence
July 28, 2008)(149 words)
Cath Hart
Jul 28, 2008 (The Australian - ABIX via COMTEX) -- Accounting and consulting group Ernst & Young has issued an advice document for Australian businesses on carbon permits. It urges them to take part in the submissions process for the Australian Government's planned greenhouse gas emissions trading scheme, before the deadline of 10 September 2008.
July 28, 2008)(149 words)
Cath Hart
Jul 28, 2008 (The Australian - ABIX via COMTEX) -- Accounting and consulting group Ernst & Young has issued an advice document for Australian businesses on carbon permits. It urges them to take part in the submissions process for the Australian Government's planned greenhouse gas emissions trading scheme, before the deadline of 10 September 2008.
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